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ABSTRACT 
In the last decades a growing awareness emerged of the relevance 
of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political 
and economic decision-making processes. In spite of a lively scientific 
debate there is no general consensus on a commonly accepted definition 
of what corruption is.  
The A. distinguishes three main paradigms, focusing on different 
(though not irreconcilable) variables.   
The first is the economic paradigm, which usually takes the 
principal-agent model of corruption as its founding pillar. In this 
paradigm corruption is considered the outcome of rational individual 
choices, and its spread within a certain organization is influenced by the 
factors defining the structure of expected costs and rewards.  
A second approach – the cultural paradigm – looks at the 
differences in cultural traditions, social norms and interiorized values 
which shape individuals’ moral preferences and consideration of his 
social and institutional role. These are a leading forces that can push a 
corrupt public or private agent (not) to violate legal norms.  
A third neo-institutional approach considers also mechanisms 
which allow the internal regulation of social interactions within corrupt 
networks, and their effects on individuals’ beliefs and preferences. 
Though the corrupt agreements cannot be enforced with legal sanctions,  
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several informal, non-written rules, contractual provisos and conventions 
may regulate the corrupt exchange between agent and corruptor. 
The A. underlines that corruption is the outcome of a multitude of 
individual and collective choices which change public opinion towards 
corruption and its diffusion throughout the state, markets and civil 
society. There is no univocal recipe to deal with anti-bribery measures, 
since corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. 
Reforms aimed at dismantling systemic corruption have to be 
finely tuned against its hidden governance structures, i.e. its internal 
regulation of exchanges and relationships. Otherwise, a vicious circle 
may emerge: the more an anti-corruption policy is needed, because 
corruption is systemic and enforced by effective third-parties, the less 
probable its formulation and implementation.  
Only when official rules are complemented by coherent informal 
institutions, bottom-up initiatives, they tend to produce the expected 
outcomes and make anticorruption regulation more effective.  
 
Keywords: corruption; public ethics; informal institutions; economic 
approach; neo-institutional paradigm; institutions responsibility; 
employment. 
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1. Introduction. 
Corruption, in spite of an extensive reference to it in the public 
debate and in the political agenda, is a somewhat cluttered concept. In 
the last decades a growing awareness emerged of the relevance of such 
phenomena as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and 
economic decision-making processes in any complex organization and 
social relationships. The issue of  dissipation, misappropriation and 
distortions in the allocation of resources caused by systemic corruption 
developing within both liberal-democratic and authoritarian regimes has 
become a serious concern for international institutions  and national 
policy-makers in an increasing number of countries. 
A corresponding interest came out also within the social sciences 
but, as it often happens, in spite of a lively scientific debate there is no 
general consensus on a commonly accepted definition of what 
corruption is. It is quite obvious that such an old-fashioned concept, 
bearing a long historical heritage, may carry several meanings. Among 
them, in classical political theory the term corruption was used to 
indicate a degenerative process operating at a macro-social level, through 
the perversion of certain constitutive features of an institutional system 
(1). In this macro perspective – which obviously requires a preliminary 
normative judgement, i.e. a value-based distinction between “better” and 
“worse” institutions – the theoretical focus is on the general premises 
and consequences of the state of degradation of political systems as a 
whole and social values underlying them. 
                                                          
(1) See for instance Aristotle, who considered corruption as forms of 
deviation from the three constitutions – monarchy, aristocracy and democracy; 
Machiavelli describing corruption as a degradation of citizens’ political virtues; 
Montesquieu who looked at corruption as the perversion of a good political order into 
an evil one. See among others Friedrich (1972) and Dobel (1978) for an analysis of 
this concept of “corruption” in classical political philosophers. 
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A different approach – which is dominant in the social sciences, 
and will be adopted here – takes corruption as a specific social practice, 
having distinctive features which can be defined at micro-level, 
minimizing value-laden implications and requirements. Corruption is a 
type of behaviour, a specific social practice which can emerge within a 
particular relational context. Any explanation of its facilitating conditions 
and effects, however, may requires an analysis of variables at a macro-
level, but there is a clear distinction between individual actions and their 
social premises or consequences (Gambetta 2002). More or less stable 
configuration of informal rules and enforcing mechanisms can in fact 
regulate the patterns of systemic corruption, making its equilibria more 
resilient to political reforms and judicial prosecution (della Porta and 
Vannucci 1999, 2005, 2007, 2012, 2014; Vannucci 2012). 
 
2. Three paradigms for the study of corruption: the economic 
approach. 
Several factors should be taken into consideration to explain and 
qualify nature and mechanisms of corruption. We may distinguish three 
main paradigms in the literature on corruption, focusing on different 
(though not irreconcilable) variables.  The first is the economic 
paradigm, which usually takes the principal-agent model of corruption as 
its founding pillar. The economic approach emphasizes the crucial role 
of individual incentives reflecting contextual opportunities to engage in 
corrupt activities. Corruption is considered the outcome of rational 
individual choices, and its spread within a certain organization is 
influenced by the factors defining the structure of expected costs and 
rewards. As with other behaviours involving deviation from laws and/or 
informal norms, the individual decision to participate in corrupt 
exchanges depends also on the expected risk of being reported and 
punished (or “cheated” by the partner in the deal), the severity of the 
potential penal and administrative penalties, and the expected rewards as 
compared with available alternatives. As Rose-Ackerman puts it: 
«In a study of corruption, one can make substantial progress with 
models that take tastes and values as given and perceive individuals as 
rational beings attempting to further their self-interest in a world of 
scarce resources. Information may be imperfect; risks may abound; but 
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individuals are assumed to do the best they can within the constraints 
imposed by a finite world» (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 5). 
As an axiom is taken that: “corruption is a crime of calculation, 
not passion. True, there are both saints who resist all temptations and 
honest officials who resist most. But when bribes are large, the chances 
of being caught small, and the penalties if caught meagre, many officials 
will succumb” (Klitgaard 1998, 4). Soreide (2014, 26) observes that: 
«The theory of individual utility maximization postulates quite 
simply that an individual will be involved in corruption if the benefits 
associated with the act are expected to outweigh the costs. (...) The 
expected benefits obviously include monetary gains as well as positions 
and power for oneself, one’s family, or one’s allies. The list of possible 
costs consists of the bribe payment, moral “costs” of violating norms 
and rules, efforts to hide the crime and money laundering, as well as the 
perceived risk of detection and the consequences of prosecution and 
punishment». 
In this “politics as a market” approach, corruption is generally 
defined within a principal-agent theoretical framework, identifying three 
necessary prerequisites of such conception of “abuse of entrusted 
power”, which is a defined as a social practice emerging within a (at least) 
three-actors relationship: 
1. delegation of decision-making power from one (individual or 
collective) actor – i.e. the principal, the truster, etc. – to another actor – 
i.e. the agent, the fiduciary, etc. – in order to pursue and realize the first 
actor’s interests and values; 
2. the trust-giving, the betrayal of trust possibility, the control of 
agent’s actions and capabilities problems, usually dealt with rules, 
supervision and enforcement mechanisms, which consequently develop 
due to the “asymmetric information” condition of actors involved within 
such relationship (2); 
                                                          
(2) Trust here can be defined here as the expectation or belief by the principal 
that the other actor (e.g. the agent) in a transaction – where the first delegates 
decision-making power to the latter – will not cheat. Asymmetric information among 
the contracting parties exists on relevant profiles of the transaction: on agent’s future 
actions (moral hazard) – whose monitoring has a cost – and on agent’s motivations 
(adverse selection), which influence his future efforts and integrity. When trust 
overcomes a certain threshold, reducing transaction costs of monitoring and enforcing 
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3. the interest of a “client” – the potential corruptor – in the 
agent’s activity, which he may try to influence entering in an exchange 
relationship – the corrupt exchange – with him (3). 
Not any breach/betrayal of trust, nor any failure of the control 
and sanctioning mechanisms of agent’s actions by the principal, which 
are a potential consequence of the delegation of decision-making power, 
can be labelled as corruption. Not any form of agent’s misbehaviour or 
malfeasance is corruption, even if often contiguous to it, having similar 
causes or corrupting effects. In formal terms, within the P-A framework 
corruption could therefore be defined as: 
(i) the infringement of formal rules and/or informal constraints 
(corresponding to explicit and/or implicit norms and contractual clauses) 
within an exchange relationship stating the delegation of decision-
making power from a principal/truster to an agent/fiduciary to pursue 
the interests of the first; 
                                                                                                                                                   
the deal, a cooperative relationship – i.e. the exchange –between the two can take 
place. The sources of trust can be diverse, as we will see, both transaction-specific and 
institutional. This is an application to the P-A framework of Gambetta’s definition: 
“trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with 
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever 
to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action" 
(GAMBETTA 2000, 217). We limit here the analysis to the issue of public agents’ 
trustworthiness. We do not consider the reciprocal source of potential of distrust, 
assuming that the public agent who accepts the exchange trusts his principal, i.e. he 
believes – for instance – that the principal will not “cheat” him not paying his public 
servant’s salary. 
(3) The basic components of corruption within a P-A perspective can be 
found in Banfield’s definition (1975: 587) of corruption within governmental 
organization: “The frame of reference is one in which an agent serves (or fails to 
serve) the interest of a principal. The agent is a person who has accepted an obligation 
(as in an employment contract) to act on behalf of his principal in some range of 
matters and, in doing so, to serve the principal’s interest as if it were his own. The 
principal may be a person or an entity such an organization or the public. In acting on 
behalf of his principal the agent must exercise some discretion; the wider the range 
(measured in terms of effects on the principal’s interest) among which he may choose, 
the broader his discretion. The situation includes third parties (persons or abstract 
entities) who stand to gain or lose from the action of the agent. There are rules (both 
laws and generally accepted standards of right conduct) violation of which entails 
some probability of penalty (cost) being imposed upon the violator”. 
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(ii) the violation of such rules – which are aimed at preserving the 
principal’s interest – realizes when the agent enters into another 
exchange with a corruptor, offering the discretionary power to take (or 
to abstain from) decision or to provide confidential information which 
assign or preserve property rights over resources the corruptor would 
otherwise not be entitled to; 
(iii) in the corrupt exchange the agents receives from the 
corruptor as a reward money or other valuable resources (i.e. the bribe) 
(4). 
Within this framework every market relationship or organizational 
relationship, involving individual or collective actors, public as well as 
private entities, can be influenced by corruption. Corruption in the 
public sector, as such, implies a fourth condition: 
(iv) the principal/truster is the political sovereign, whose interest 
can be defined as public interest depending on the institutional setting of 
the corresponding polity. The exercise of public decision-making power 
in a democratic government can correspondingly be analytically 
described as a complex chain of principal-agent relationships between 
electorate, elected officials and bureaucrats in their functional and 
hierarchical attribution of roles and functions (5)  According to Cox and 
                                                          
(4) State activity, like market exchanges, modifies the existing structure of 
property rights over valuable resources. Public agents may use the coercive power of 
the state to create, regulate, allocate and maintain property rights to the advantage of 
corrupters. In the transaction between the corrupt agent and the corrupter, in fact, 
property rights created or allocated through the political process are exchanged. Three 
decision-making sectors may create such rights: a) the acquisition of goods and 
services paid by the private actors for more than their market value; b) the selling of 
the licensing of use of public goods for a lower price than their market value; c) the 
arbitrary use of enforcement activities, that attribute the competence to selectively 
impose costs or reduce the value of some private goods to public agents (ROSE-
ACKERMAn 1978: 61-3). Corruption therefore is “just a black market for the property 
rights over which politicians and bureaucrats have allocative power. Rather than 
assigning rights according to political power, rights are sold to the highest bidder” 
(BENSON 1990: 159; BENSON AND BADEN 1985). 
(5) A similar representation implies that along the chain all principals are 
“benevolent”, i.e. public-interest oriented: “apart from a limited number of countries 
and situation, however, this is not the current state of affairs. Most principals’ must be 
assumed to be non-benevolent, which by implication means that both corruption 
deterrents in this model can be easily cheated upon: there is hardly any risk of being 
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McCubbin (2001, 2-3), in fact, each polity – according to the divisions 
and needs of its society and rulers – select a set of institution to resolve 
its fundamental political problems: 
«These institutions define a sequence of principal-agent 
relationships. In a typical representative democracy, for example, there 
are three broad delegations that might be noted. First, the sovereign 
people delegate decision-making power (usually via a written 
constitution) to a national legislature and executive. […] A second step in 
the delegation of power occurs when the details of the internal 
organization of the legislature and executive are settled. […] A third step 
in the delegation of power takes the legislature (or its political chiefs) as 
principal and various bureaus and agencies as agents». 
More generally, in this ideal liberal-democratic institutional setting 
the ultimate principal/truster can be identified as the sovereign people, 
i.e. the citizenry, while any public officials (elected, appointed, 
nominated, selected by merit, etc.) is the agent/fiduciary. Any agent 
entrusted by public organizations (governments, public companies or 
agencies, etc.) with the power to manage resources in the interest of the 
principal also has private interests that may not coincide with those of 
his principal/truster. Moreover, he can hide information on himself as 
well as on the characteristics and content of his tasks and activities. This 
is the reason why, in the delegation of power and responsibilities to the 
agent, the principal usually does not attribute him an unconstrained 
capability to act in his interests, laying down rules and procedures which 
limit the agent’s range of discretion, and develops various mechanisms of 
legal, administrative, social, political or contractual control and 
enforcement of infringements and abuses. Among the rules posed by the 
principal there is the prohibition of accepting payments or other rewards 
from “third parties” for the accomplishment of delegated tasks, as this 
would increase the risk of the agent disregarding the interests of the 
principal. 
Corruption causes then a specific distortion of the relationship 
between principal and agent– to be distinguished by other distortions 
and abuses – induced by a third actor, the corruptor. The exchange 
                                                                                                                                                   
detected if there is no one seeking detection; similarly, no severe punishment will be 
enacted if those responsible for enacting legal remedies are themselves corruptible” 
(TEORELL 2007, 4). 
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relationship with a briber causes/prompts the agent to violate 
constraints imposed by (formal and informal) rules. By offering money 
or other rewards, the corrupter succeeds in obtaining from the agent 
favourable decisions, reserved information, protection (della Porta and 
Vannucci 2012, 6). In the transaction between the agent and the 
corruptor property rights on resources created and allocated as a 
consequence of the public agent’s activity and influence are shared 
between the two. The agent modifies (or maintain, having the power to 
modify) to the advantage of the briber such allocation of property rights, 
obtaining as a reward a fraction of the value thus created. 
 
3. The cultural paradigm. 
A second approach – the cultural paradigm – looks at the 
differences in cultural traditions, social norms and interiorized values 
which shape individuals’ moral preferences and consideration of his 
social and institutional role. Ethical standards matter in corruption. They 
are a leading forces that can push a corrupt public or private agent (not) 
to violate legal norms. Taken as a relevant explanatory factor, they have 
been labelled in different ways in the literature on corruption: moral 
costs in economic theory, cultural norms in comparative politics, 
professional standards in constructivist perspectives, informal constraints 
in neo-institutional theory.  
In an economic perspective moral cost of corruption is a negative 
addendum, reflecting individual’s ethical preferences, that enters in the 
choice of individual actors whether or not to engage in corrupt 
exchanges. Reframed as a first-party control mechanism over certain 
rules, moral cost can be considered as normative barriers, expressing the 
agent’s preferences and internalized values addressing his actions (6). 
                                                          
(6) First-party mechanisms are enforced on oneself by an actor: “An actor who 
imposes rules and sanctions on himself is exercising first-party control” (ELLICKSON 
1991, 126). This mechanism is based upon the structure of internalized values (such as 
ethical or moral codes) and self-control system, sanctioned by the personal feeling of 
discomfort or guilt which – even if not discovered and exposed – accompanies certain 
actions (in this case, the betrayal of trust of agents towards the interests of citizenry 
they should realize, or between partners in illicit deals). As Coleman (1990, 243) puts 
it: “The norm may be internal to the individual carrying out the action, with sanctions 
applied by that individual to his own actions. In such a case a norm is said to be 
internalized. An individual feels internally generated rewards for performing actions 
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Normative barriers depends on the self-imposed and self-enforced rules 
constraining the agent not to accept corrupt deals with other actors, 
whose intensity corresponds to the “moral character” of an individual 
facing the choice among different actions that are rule-governed in the 
interest of the public organization. Normative barriers are stronger the 
higher is the degree of agent’s identification with the public 
organization’s values and purposes. They correspond to a self-inflicted 
loss of utility that results from engaging in an illegal or socially blamed 
actions (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 113; della Porta and Vannucci 2005) The 
higher the moral cost for a given agent, the stronger will be his 
“preference for formal rule-fulfilment”, that is, the kind of psychological 
suffering, discomfort or guilt personally expected in case of 
infringement, perceived as a betrayal of public trust, independently from 
its detection. In general terms, moral costs are higher when public 
agents’ preferences ordering over his actions (and their outcomes) are 
closer to those embodied by the rules addressing the functioning of the 
public organization, and backed by the values which prevails within his 
social circles. In this case, in fact, the betrayal the public trust becomes a 
cause of discomfort in itself, similar to betraying the own agent’s second-
order preferences towards his own integrity (Hirshmann 1982; Pizzorno 
2007). 
Individuals belonging to different societies and organizations can 
be pushed towards corruption by the nature of their internalized values and 
by social pressures. While the economic paradigm in the last decades 
dominated scientific research on corruption, theories on “moral costs” – 
or better, on normative barriers against corruption –consider not only 
the influence of exogenous macro-variables on the degree of “average 
ethical aversion” against corruption, but also endogenous dynamics 
which shape individuals’ preferences and moral constraints (Pizzorno 
1992). If the economic perspective considers corruption as a crime of 
calculation, not passion, according to the cultural approach also passions 
matter in corruption choices, which means ethical judgements, civicness, 
public spiritdness. As Elster observes: “Although it is hard to prove, I 
believe that a variation in corruption across countries is explained largely 
                                                                                                                                                   
that are proper according to an internalized norm or feels internally generated 
punishment for performing  actions that are improper according to an internalized 
norm.” 
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by the degree of public-spiritedness of their officials, not by the 
cleverness of institutional design” (Elster 1989, 158). According to 
Pizzorno (1992), the average degree of “sense of the state” of public 
officials and politicians is a crucial variable, perhaps the most relevant 
factor in the explanation of variations in corruption across countries and 
along time. The analysis of such factors requires a more in-depth 
research on the mechanisms which allow actors to enter and operate 
within networks of corrupt exchanges, through a selection and 
socialization process which – besides transmitting “routines” and 
informal norms – also shapes them along time their interiorized values. 
Generally speaking, any theory of normative barriers has to explain 
under which conditions agent’s preferences on the outcomes of his 
actions (in the exercise of a delegated power, or as potential corruptors) 
tend to overlap, are homogeneous or coherent with purposes embodied 
by state procedures and rules. In countries, organizations and exchange 
relationships where agents exhibits stronger normative barriers there is 
trust that a correct and effective exercise of the decision-making power 
delegated to the agent will not be misused or deceived – even without 
implementing strict controls. On the contrary, lower normative barriers 
encourage defection from their contractual and procedural constraints, 
therefore promoting distrust towards agents, which can be 
counterbalanced by a strengthening of public supervision, i.e. state-
backed enforcement mechanisms. 
Developed within rational choice approaches, the notion of moral 
costs implies that individuals are able to manage “rationally” a trade-off 
between different interests (“ethical”/second-order versus 
“material”/first-order preferences, for instance) and consequently 
maximize their utility. Expressing moral preferences as a cost is 
functional to formal economic modeling of purposeful corruption 
choices. The implicit assumption is that a same numeraire can be used by 
an agent to weight – as an constant unit of account – both the measure 
of worth of the expected proceeds of corrupt exchange and the loss of 
utility caused by moral discomfort. On the contrary, ethical preferences 
imply that the individual’s evaluation of any conceivable action – and 
even more clearly when they are stigmatized as corrupt within a certain 
society – can be expressed only in a framework of mutually recognized 
values, i.e. in an inter-subjective and relational dimension. Unlike moral 
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costs, the concept of interiorized normative barriers reflect individuals’ 
preferences, slowly developed through a socialization process and the 
intergenerational transmission of  norms, values, principles. When 
normatively oriented, agents do not evaluate the “economic cost” of an 
infringements of their interiorized normative standard, which are shared 
and recognized as valuable within their relevant social circles. 
A notion of moral cost as exogenously given preferences is, 
implicitly or explicitly, challenged also by comparative approaches that 
stress how several mechanisms can induce variations in values and 
cultures, not only among different individuals, but also across groups, 
social contexts, states and historical periods. The “average distribution” 
of moral costs may vary along time, normally in slow-moving process, as 
a cultural heritage (Pierson 2004). Variations in normative barriers could 
therefore explain different individual responses to similar opportunities 
for corruption. Even when comparable institutional frameworks produce 
analogous structures of incentives, the diffusion of political corruption 
may vary – even significantly, as Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index shows – due to the average moral attitudes among the 
citizens, entrepreneurs, public agents (7) Among others, the robustness 
and other properties of social capital, civicness, political culture, amoral 
familism, religious beliefs have been considered in the literature as 
macro-variables having a direct effect on the average structure of “ethical 
preferences” of actors potentially involved in corrupt deals (8) 
Taking normative barriers as a sort of psychological aversion to the 
betrayal of public trust, i.e. as a first-party enforcement mechanisms of 
rules against corruption, some factors we be singled out that through 
social interaction influence their strength and evolution. In other words, 
there are social processes that – under certain conditions – make 
individual preferences and values adapt to prevailing beliefs and 
expectations about the reality of corruption. When socially transmitted 
                                                          
(7) Cfr. Transparency International, Corruption perception index, in 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014. 
(8) When looking for cultural norms and values framing the choices of 
individuals belonging to different societies and organizations, a first observation, 
fuelled by comparative analysis, often points to religion as a determinant. Several 
studies have found, for instance, a statistically significant correlation between the 
diffusion of hierarchical forms of religion (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and 
Islam) and corruption (LA PORTA ET AL. 1997; 1999; TREISMAN 2000, PALDAM 2001). 
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and enforced values are coherent with state-backed rules and procedures, 
corruption will be collectively labelled and individually experienced as a 
blameable activity; vice versa, it will be taken as a “normal” or justifiable 
activity when shared and convergent expectations on its unavoidability 
or “normality tend to prevail”, socialization on its daily practice is set in 
motion, etc..  
In the literature on corruption normative barriers/moral costs are a 
neglected variable– even when they are taken as a variable, and not as a 
parameter exogenously given (9). Hirschman (1982) formulated a 
theoretical hypothesis on factors shaping normative barriers along time, 
emphasizing how the incidence of corruption depends not only on 
institutional opportunities, but also on “public morality” or “public 
spirit”, i.e. on how many individuals within a certain society are corruption-
prone or corruption adverse.  The evolution of public ethics standards among 
citizen and public officials may reflect generalized disappointment after 
cycles of strong involvement in public affairs and collective action: 
«Corruption can thus be viewed as a response to a change in tastes: 
losses in satisfaction that is yielded by action in public interest are made 
up by material gains. But ordinarily the process is not one of small 
variations in individual preferences, This is so because the practice of 
corruption has a further, powerful effect on the public-private 
preferences. If I act this way, o the erstwhile public citizen will argue in 
order to justify his corrupt actions to himself» (Hirschman 1982, 124). 
When the diffusion of values oriented towards the pursuit of 
private welfare follow an intense but unsatisfactory mobilization centred 
on public issues, the “moral barriers” against the application of the same 
logic to the management of public affairs are inexorably lowered. A shift 
in the balance between the “public versus public oriented” preferences 
of agents – generated by discontent – is the premise for a diffusion of 
corruption. In turn, when such practices become a dominant feature of 
public life, the “bad example” contribute to this “value shift” lowering 
normative barriers: “corruption, which is at first a response to 
                                                          
(9) An underling hypothesis is that moral costs are either constant, a sort of 
“fixed cost” of corruption, or increase as the size of the bribe increases (ROSE-
ACKERMAN 1978: 121). Alam (1990) adopt an analogous concept of “aversion to 
corruption”, defined as the value of the marginal utility of corruption payoff relative 
to that of a legal activities. 
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dissatisfaction with public  affairs becomes a determinant of further, 
more profound dissatisfaction which in turn sets the stage for more 
corruption. At the end of the process the public spirit is driven out 
altogether” (Hirschman 1982, 124-125). 
In fact, the structure of values underlying the so-called neo-liberal 
paradigm – dominant since 1980s’ in western democracies economic and 
social policy-making, after the cycle of collective mobilization of the 
1960s and 1970s – may have produced a similar result. It is not just the 
corresponding regulative framework, or better the de-regulative policy 
approach underlying neoliberalist policies, which may be corruption-
enhancing: “in an attempt to reduce certain kinds of government 
interventions in the economy, it encourages or provide space for a 
number of mutual interferences between the government and private 
firms, many of which raise serious problems for both the free market 
and the probity of public institutions” (Crouch 2011, 93). The 
glorification of “greed” as petrol fuelling the self-regulating gears of 
markets – coherently with a naïve expression of the neoliberalist creed – 
has been exemplified by the fictional character Gordon Gekko, the 
cynical trader of “Wall Street” movie, in a often quoted speech: 
«The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better 
word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, 
and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit» (10). 
Clearly, amoral neoliberalism as “a cynical ideology according to which 
profits have to be maximized at all costs” defines a structure of values 
conflicting with any conceivable notion of public ethics and public 
spiritedness (della Porta 2013). Mény (2000, 213) observes that 
“corruption is thus more likely to spread in cases where the ‘immune 
defence systems’ of the group tend to weaken and the ‘moral cost’ drops; 
as will occur when public behaviour is less prized than private, when 
producing results comes to matter more than observing standards, 
monetary values more than ethical or symbolic values”. 
When shared and transmitted through socialization, amoral 
conceptions and practices of capitalism may bring to the application of a 
similar “market fundamentalism” (Stiglitz 2012) also in the relationship 
between private and public agents. Since corruption in a democratic 
                                                          
(10) Quotation from the movie Wall Street, directed by Oliver Stone, 1987, in 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes. 
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decision-making implies precisely the substitution of a demand-supply 
logic to the universalistic principles of the rule of law, we may expect 
that amoral neoliberalism as an internalized set of values produces a 
twofold effect. First, it weakens normative barriers against corruption, 
especially when accompanying the disappointment which follows public 
engagement cycles, according to the Hirschman’s hypothesis. Secondly, 
being involved in corrupt practices, i.e. applying a market logic within a 
“bureaucratic” and “state-centred” environment, may produce within 
circles of agents involved in illicit acts a self-legitimizing stance, therefore 
reversing into some sort of moral benefit the practice of corruption 
itself. 
According to Pizzorno (1992) a crucial variable shaping moral costs 
(or benefits) of corruption is the nature of ethical values and criteria for 
moral judgement which are currently applied within certain social 
groups, organizations, “circles of moral recognition” modelling along 
time the individuals’ “ethical preferences”. Specifically, a category of 
political actors vulnerable to corruption are “business politicians” (della 
Porta 1992), as well as other bureaucratic and economic agents who 
originate from or are socialized within groups not fostering the respect 
of law and legal procedures as a value in itself. Business politicians can 
be described as "homines novi" –  literally new men – whose entry into 
politics from the Roman Republic onwards is considered to have raised 
the tolerance threshold for deviation from established norms and 
customs (11). 
Pizzorno (1992: 45) has suggested that the "homines novi" are 
more susceptible to participation in corruption because of lower moral 
costs of behaving illegally: 
«entering politics, the 'new men' tend to break with what still binds 
them to their roots or, leaving aside metaphors, to detach themselves 
from the reference groups in which they were socialized. Politicians who 
belong to the socially dominant classes and have been socialized in 
reference groups whose morality is the same as that of legal authority, on 
                                                          
11 According to Banfield and Wilson (1967), for instance, in American cities 
the greater propensity of newcomers to involvement in political corruption can be 
explained by the need of new entrepreneurs and political bosses to break into a world 
which tends to exclude them. Once they have "arrived", these same social groups 
become defenders of the new order. 
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the other hand, continue to view their actions as being judged and 
rewarded according to the criteria of those groups and therefore 
conform to their norms». 
Monetary and political rewards gained through corruption, in fact, 
can be enjoyed in a socially and personal satisfying manner only if this 
does not lead to stigmatization by an individual's reference groups, i.e. 
those groups whose members’ judgments really matter for the individual. 
For an individual, in fact, “the moral cost is lower the more ephemeral 
appear to him those circles of moral recognition that offer positive 
criteria for the respect of the law” (Pizzorno 1992: 46). Individuals will 
incur in a psychological suffering when in both their own (and their 
peers’) perspectives corrupt behavior involves a violation of values – 
such as “public service oriented” ethics – which are internalized (12) 
Typically, the internalization of norms depends also on so-called pride in 
one’s position and the prestige of public service: the more public roles are 
socially rewarded in the public consideration, the less desirable it 
becomes to violate official procedures and norms – since it implies the 
risk of a costly exit from those social circles. 
The congruence between legal rules regulating public agents’ conduct 
and the informal norms which shape the value structure of social groups – 
politicians, entrepreneurs, functionaries , professionals, etc. – is therefore 
the key variable. Higher consistency between them makes first-party (the 
internalized sense of guilt, expressed by normative barriers) and second-
party (ostracism, social stigma, etc.) enforcement mechanisms 
constraining. The activation of “virtuous” or “vicious” circles above 
described between state and societal accountability in turn influence the 
strength of normative barriers. The (divergent) contents and the degree 
of institutionalization of informal constraints which de-facto regulate 
public agent’s activity – and their private counterparts’ – come here into 
play. But informal norms can generate a structure of incentives going 
                                                          
(12) The diffusion of corruption, like other white collar crime, can be 
explained with reference to work-related subcultures  providing a specialized “reality 
construction” on the basis of ideological commitment or work concerns (HOLZNER 
1972: 95). Work-related subcultures “tend to isolate their members from the 
mainstream of social life (…). Because of this isolation, work-related subcultures are 
often able to maintain a definition of certain criminal activities as acceptable or even 
required behavior, when they are clearly condemned by society as a whole” 
(COLEMAN 1987: 422-23). 
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both ways. They can support legal rules against corruption, as well as an 
alternative sets of non-written codes of conduct and “values” justifying 
and disciplining it. Far from anomic behaviour, corruption emerges as 
endemic, i.e. well-regulated. This is precisely the focus of the neo-
institutional paradigm. 
 
4. The neo-institutional paradigm. 
A third neo-institutional approach considers not only moral 
values or economic incentives, but also mechanisms which allow the 
internal regulation of social interactions within corrupt networks, and 
their effects on individuals’ beliefs and preferences (13). The concept of 
normative barriers is a cross field to introduce two variables, which refer 
to the informal “institutional framework” where the exchange between 
corrupt agent and corruptor takes place. Public agent’s and corruptor’s 
reciprocal “contractual obligations” are illegal or contrary to socially 
enforced informal codes of conduct which regulate their activity. As a 
result, they cannot be overtly arranged nor enforced through state third 
party-mechanisms. The risk of being cheated by the partners, who may 
renege on their promises, failing to pay the agreed bribe or failing to 
provide the agreed favors, consequently increases.  In these cases, the 
public agent and the corruptor of course cannot ask a judge to protect 
their property rights over the resources that were exchanged. In the 
agreement between public agents and corruptors: “contracts are not 
enforceable in court of law; the assets of the illegal operation may be 
seized at any time that law enforcement agencies identify the operation 
and the associated assets; all participants are subject to the risk of arrest 
and imprisonment” (Reuter 1983: 114). The natural environmental 
conditions for corrupt exchanges are secrecy, lack of transparency, 
severely restricted participation, significant exit costs (Lambsdorff 2002: 
222). High transaction costs, in other words, are a by-product of the 
uncertainty on the successful conclusion of their deal: “Since corruption 
transactions occur outside the law, there are many opportunities for the 
parties to take advantage of each other. Numerous situations allow for 
                                                          
(13) A neo-institutional approach to the analysis of corruption has been 
adopted, among others, by Husted (1994), della Porta and Vannucci (1999; 2012), 
Lambsdorff (2007). 
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the systematic distortion of information in order to benefit a particular 
party in a corruption transaction” (Husted 1994: 19) (14).  
 The corrupt contractual agreements cannot be enforced with legal 
sanctions, but several first, second, and third-party enforcement 
mechanisms are nevertheless available to actors. Informal, non-written 
rules, contractual provisos and conventions may in fact regulate the 
corrupt exchange between agent and corruptor, with sanctions attached 
to them. Without any enforcement mechanisms, in fact, the corrupt 
exchange would be doomed to failure, being trust in potential partners’ 
goodwill a scarce resource in itself, even more in illicit deals. Once a 
certain organizational texture and ‘cultural adaptation’ to corruption has 
developed, informal codes and governance structures provide internal 
stability and enforcement mechanisms to illegal dealings in specific areas 
of public activity, reducing uncertainty among partners in relationships 
which thus appear more lucrative and less morally censurable. This co-
evolution of incentives and cultural values, in other words, is path 
dependent: the heritage of corruption in the past produces increasing 
returns in subsequent periods by providing informal norms, learning of 
specialized skills, organizational shields and other mechanisms of 
protection against external intrusion by the authorities and internal 
friction among corrupt actors (della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 219-22.). 
Along time, the informally regulated practice of corruption may also 
influence other economic and cultural variables, since it neutralizes moral 
barriers and creates more profitable opportunities rooted in formal 
procedures and decision-making processes. 
                                                          
(14) Transaction costs are the costs incurred by social actors to establish, 
maintain and transfer property rights, i.e. to protect ones’ capability to exercise a 
choice over valuable resources (ALLEN 1991). In this perspective, they are “associated 
with the transfer, capture, and protecting of rights” (BARZEL 1989: 2). Such rights 
simply reflect the individual’s expected capability to consume or transfer valuable 
assets, that can – or can not – be guaranteed by third-party state enforcement 
mechanisms (which can be invoked only in case of legal rights). The difference 
between ordinary exchanges of legal commodities and corrupt exchanges is that in the 
latter case property rights over the resources at stakes are more fragile, uncertain, 
aleatory. Actors participating to corrupt exchanges can indeed be assimilated to 
thieves, who “lack legal rights over what they steal; nevertheless, they are able to 
consume it and to exclude others from it, to derive income from it, and to alienate it. 
[...] The lack of legal rights may reduce the value of those capabilities, but it does not 
negate them” (BARZEL 1989: 110). 
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 Under certain conditions, the “value of the word given” to 
partners in the corrupt exchange can have a positive consideration in the 
actor’s moral preferences. For instance, personal or idiosyncratic sources 
of trust and loyalty towards counterparts can generate an ethical 
preference towards “integrity in corruption”, a moral stance that to be 
trustworthy in the management of bribes has a value in itself. First-party 
control occurs when the violation of the informal norms of corruption 
produces for those who have internalized their obligations a psychic 
cost, feelings of guilt or discomfort. If all partners in corrupt deals share 
similar internalized norms, reciprocal trust – if existing – will not be 
betrayed and illegal exchanges can be successfully concluded.  
 Under certain condition such moral benefit of corruption can be 
amplified by the existence of strong sources of loyalty alternative to the 
state, particularly within societies where there are relevant (ideological, 
ethnical, religious, etc.) cleavages and contrasting sub-cultures (Pizzorno 
1992). Kinship, ethnic, political and other social ties, in fact, tend to 
strengthen such first-party enforcement mechanisms. The corrupt 
exchange can be judged as functional to the realization of long-term 
purposes of actors and organizations (especially political parties with a 
strong ideological orientation) towards whom the agent and/or the 
briber identify, or are altruistically inclined (15).  
 Second and third-party enforcement mechanisms can also 
guarantee an hidden order within the corrupt deal: accountability and 
trustworthiness towards partners in corruption, opposite to the usual 
meaning of accountability in the public agent’s activity. 
Second-party enforcement is based on the sanctions directly 
administered by partners in the corrupt exchange, which often rely on 
the transaction-specific expected advantages of a reiterated relationship. 
In repeated interactions, in fact, the menace of termination of the 
                                                          
(15) In the words of an Italian politician: ““I have been strongly and morally 
helped by the awareness that I was using the bribes that I received in recent years in 
the interests of the party. It has been decisive in the fact that I can still walk proudly 
into the Milan headquarters of the party and I am known by collaborators, 
functionaries and leaders as the one who decisively contributed, for such a long time, 
to party life” (Mani Pulite: 23). Italian party cashiers were also selected by leaders 
precisely for their high and undisputed and publicly recognized level of integrity in the 
management of bribes (DELLA PORTA AND VANNUCCI 1999, 97-99). 
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exchange relationship (as well as other forms of direct retaliation) in case 
of cheating may under certain condition – long time horizon and high 
frequency of interactions, low discount rate of future payoffs, etc – 
discourage defection and cheating in the corrupt exchange. The 
circulation of information about one’s previous actions within the 
network of actors involved in corruption further on increases the 
effectiveness of partner’s expected sanctions, since also reputational 
assets enter into play. 
Third-party enforcement mechanisms may imply within networks 
of corrupt and corrupting actors a widespread adhesion to informal rules 
stating how to behave in hidden exchanges and how to punish those 
who do not fulfil their prescriptions and proscriptions. In this opaque 
universe agents’ cheating is individually enforced, within the circles of 
participants to the “corruption game”, with social stigma and blame, but 
also with marginalization and ostracism, i.e. through elimination from a 
“market” where profitable opportunities could emerge. 
As the domain of corruption network extends, raising the costs of 
the ex-ante gathering of information, identification of partners, 
monitoring and sanctioning of deceitful partners, the demand for 
protection increases. A specialized third-party enforcer, distinct from 
actors involved in the deal, may also enter into the scene selling his 
protective services. As we will see, individuals or collective actors 
(organizations) can use different resources (influence over the public 
authority; ideological rewards; violence, information and economic 
resources, the power to assure or deny access to profitable opportunities) 
to enforce rules and contracts, i.e. to protect the allocation of rights 
emerging from the corrupt exchange: 
«the essence of enforcement power is in the enforcer's ability to 
punish (i.e., to impose costs).  Those costs can be imposed both by the 
use of violence and by other means. (…). Different third parties impose 
costs by different means. The state imposes costs through use of the 
physical force of the police, and the Catholic church through  
excommunication and the prospect of purgatory. As is evident from 
these illustrations, the ability to impose costs does not necessitate the use 
of physical force, nor does it require a formal organization” (Barzel 2002, 
38-9)». 
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Third-party enforcers of the informal constraints regulating corrupt 
exchanges “reduce uncertainty by  establishing a stable (but not 
necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction” (North 1990, 6). 
Either public (politicians, bureaucrats, etc.) or private (entrepreneurs, 
brokers, etc.) actors may enter as individuals in the protection market, 
using different means to sanction cheating or defecting partners. Certain 
organizations can also become third-party enforcers in corrupt 
exchanges: political parties, firms, mafia and other criminal groups, 
private associations, Masonic lodges, trade-unions among them. 
Enforcement provided by organization may be more or less effective 
according to several factors, among them its nature, scope, stability, 
internal structure (16). Political parties, for instance, can use their 
influence over public decision-making processes – whose 
implementation is guaranteed by the coercive authority of the state – to 
impose costs on cheaters in corruption contracts, or vice versa to 
promise future advantages to those who respect those informal rules. 
They can, in fact, use as an enforcing mechanism their capability to rule 
out cheaters from future profitable interactions with public bodies or 
party structures: career perspectives for lower-level bureaucrats, support 
                                                          
(16) Rules governing the corrupt exchange are enforced through sanctions, 
whose administration is also governed by certain “procedures”. Third-party enforcers 
can be self-constrained by second-order rules, or they can solve disputes more 
arbitrarily – making the outcome of their enforcement activity less predictable, 
therefore reducing the “quality” of their protection services. Third-party enforcers are 
rarely neutral to the transacting parties, nor they necessarily do restrict themselves to 
prescribing and impartially enforcing rules for compliance, as in the idealized rule-of-
law operations of the state. There are problems of reliability and incentive-
compatibility in the activities of actors and organizations involved as enforcers in the 
market for corruption. In order to be credible, accepted and trusted by corrupt actors, 
enforcers have to control and exhibit specific resources, whose use is costly –they 
have to be compensated for their services. At the same time, protection has “public 
good” attributes that makes it exploitable by free-riders, at least to a certain degree 
(GAMBETTA 1993): when expectations converge towards a smooth functioning of the 
rules of corruption, the demand for third-party enforcement declines. Specialized 
enforcers must therefore police also their “extractive” activities, in order to motivate 
and monitor payments of protection-money. On the other hand, since the essence of 
protection consists in the power to impose costs, partners in corrupt transactions 
must also be reassured that the guarantor will not use its power in order to seize 
(instead of protect) assets exchanged. 
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for publicly appointed positions or candidatures for elected politicians, 
awards of public contracts or licenses to entrepreneurs, etc.  They might 
also appeal to common ideological values to obtain the compliance of 
their corrupt members. Criminal organizations also have the power to 
enforce illegal deals by using coercion, as well as their reputation as 
“tough guys” able to adjudicate disputes. Cartels of contracting firms 
may menace exclusion from profitable long-term relationships. In table 1 
some of the main factors influencing organizations’ enforcement 
capability are schematically represented. In general terms, the “quality” 
of the governance mechanisms of corrupt transaction can be defined as: 
 
 
Table 1: Enforcement mechanisms within corrupt exchanges 
Enforcement mechanism Rules 
enforced 
Sanctions Sanctioning 
agent 
      
First-
party 
control 
 Moral 
benefit 
Interiori
zed 
ethical 
values 
and 
beliefs 
Psychological 
suffering and 
guilt 
Cheating 
agent on 
himself 
Second
-party 
control 
 Hidden 
accountabi
lity 
Informal 
contract
ual 
obligatio
ns 
Termination 
of the 
relationship; 
inflicting 
costs 
through 
other means 
(including 
violence) 
Partners in 
corrupt 
exchanges 
Third-
party 
contro
l 
Social 
control 
Hidden 
accountabi
lity 
Informal 
codes of 
conduct 
regulatin
g illegal 
deals 
Ostracism or 
reputational 
damage with 
a loss of 
opportunities 
for exchange; 
Other 
individual 
actors who 
interact – 
with 
different 
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blame. 
 
roles –  in 
the network 
of 
corruption 
 Individual 
enforcement 
Hidden 
accountabi
lity 
Informal 
codes of 
conduct 
regulatin
g illegal 
deals; 
informal 
contract
ual 
obligatio
n 
Exclusion 
from future 
opportunities 
for exchange; 
violence, etc. 
Specialized 
individual 
third-party 
enforcers 
using private 
resources or 
resources 
derived 
from their 
position 
within a 
network of 
relationships 
 Organizati
onal 
enforcement 
Hidden 
accountabi
lity 
Informal 
codes of 
conduct 
regulatin
g illegal 
deals; 
informal 
contract
ual 
obligatio
n 
Exclusion 
from future 
opportunities 
for exchange; 
adverse 
political 
influence; 
adverse 
bureaucratic 
decisions, 
ideological 
“excommuni
cation”; 
violence, etc..  
Specialized 
third-party 
enforcers 
using 
resource 
derived 
from their 
roles within 
an 
organization 
 
 
5. Some conclusive remarks. 
An inclination towards corruption or towards integrity is not etched 
in the genetic heritage or cultural roots of a society. Corruption, akin in 
this to good governance, is the outcome of a multitude of individual and 
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collective choices, supported and discouraged by the institutional matrix, 
social relationships and circles of recognition, the structure of social 
values and cultural norms. The combination of these elements creates 
expectations, habits, beliefs, preferences, ways of thinking and judging the 
sense of one’s own – as well as others’ – actions, which direct its 
evolution over time and change public opinion towards corruption and its 
diffusion throughout the state, markets and civil society. An effective 
anticorruption policy addresses such change discouraging individual 
involvement in illicit deals through material disincentives, societal 
recognition of the value of integrity, moral barriers.  
A major challenge in anticorruption is how to accomplish with 
policy measures a difficult exit from systemic or widespread corruption. 
In general terms, anti-corruption policies are effective when they diminish 
opportunities for and increase societal and normative barriers against 
corruption. But any reform which influences macro-variables may have 
only a remote connection – in both spatial and temporal terms – with the 
factual conditions and informal constraints influencing the activities of a 
specific subset of actors who can accept or offer a bribe, while the script 
which regulates their transactions remains substantially unaltered (17) 
There is no simple or univocal recipe to deal with anti-bribery measures, 
since corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, influenced 
by a multitude of interrelated variables which affect both the anticipated 
benefits, the expectations and the socially recognized values which allow 
for such calculations to take place in the first place. Such conditions can 
explain the difficulties encountered in their implementation: “the history 
of anti-corruption campaigns around the world is not propitious. At the 
national and local levels, in ministries and in agencies such as the police, 
even highly publicized efforts to reduce corruption have tended to lush, 
lapse, and, ultimately, disappoint” (Klitgaard et al. 2000: 11). 
 A point emerge from previous analysis: reforms aimed at 
dismantling systemic corruption have to be finely tuned against its 
hidden governance structures, i.e. its internal regulation of exchanges and 
relationships. The hidden accountability of corrupt deals, in fact, is a 
                                                          
(17) According to the script approach, any crime can be identified and 
classified according to the routine steps followed by its actors, using this identification 
to find crime prevention measures (CORNISH 1994). 
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powerful force lowering the effectiveness of both legal and societal 
mechanisms of control and enforcement. 
 Moreover, in the absence of countervailing forces external to the 
corrupt environment – such as the entry of “honesty-promoting” 
competitors in the political arena, a strong anticorruption movement 
from below, channeling the pressure towards integrity of the public 
opinion, etc. – a vicious circle may emerge: the more an anti-corruption 
policy is needed, because corruption is systemic and “centripetal”, i.e. 
enforced by effective third-parties, the less probable its formulation and 
implementation. In this case, in fact, most policy makers will also be 
involved – as participants in illegal deals, therefore liable to be 
blackmailed, or indirect beneficiary of rents collected through 
corruption. In this context even apparently robust policy measures – the 
institution of an anti-corruption authority, for instance – can easily be 
reversed into yet another corruptible or useless public agency, not 
executing or financing its operations. 
Only when official rules are complemented by coherent informal 
institutions they tend to produce the expected outcomes. The fertile 
ground of any anticorruption regulatory reform lies therefore in a 
simultaneous set in motion of bottom-up initiatives, empowering societal 
actors, allowing them to become really influential towards those political 
entrepreneurs having the authority to change the formal “rules of the 
game”, making anticorruption regulation more effective. The 
involvement of civil society and local community participation in anti-
corruption policies may represent a potential preliminary spark to set in 
motion any conceivable positive feedback interplay between actors’ interests 
towards integrity and optimistic expectations that an exit from systemic 
corruption can be found. Recognizing the importance of “appropriate 
cultural resources” in the promotion and maintenance of integrity, anti-
corruption projects should adapt to the social values prevailing in each 
country (Newell 2011). 
In recent years social movements denouncing kleptocratic 
practices, corrupt politicians and entrepreneurs, have developed a 
radically different explanatory framework. Consequently, also the policy 
toolkit enlarged. The fight against corruption is a basic constituent of a 
wider effort of citizens to oppose the deterioration of the quality of 
democratic processes. In order to raise resistance against corruption it is 
 
A.VANNUCCI, Three paradigms for the analysis of corruption 
LLI, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2015   27 
 
therefore necessary to restore or discover new accountability and 
transparency mechanisms that will permit a more effective control of 
citizens on the rulers. This implies the revitalization of a conception of 
politics intended not as a technique, but as a contribution to a realization 
of the common good. Experiences and experiments that increase the 
citizens’ opportunities to participate in public policies, in the 
formulation, decision-making and implementation phases, increase 
information available to the public, spreading a broad awareness and 
knowledge that in the “technocratic” conception of politics are instead – 
for ideological beliefs or “wilful misconduct” – kept jealously hidden 
(della Porta et al., 2014). 
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